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Abstract
This paper studies the problem of detecting a potential malicious relay node by a source node that relies on the relay to forward
information to other nodes. The channel model of two source nodes simultaneously sending symbols to a relay is considered.
The relay is contracted to forward the symbols that it receives back to the sources in the amplify-and-forward manner. However
there is a chance that the relay may send altered symbols back to the sources. Each source attempts to individually detect such
malicious acts of the relay by comparing the empirical distribution of the symbols that it receives from the relay conditioned on its
own transmitted symbols with known stochastic characteristics of the channel. It is shown that maliciousness of the relay can be
asymptotically detected with sufficient channel observations if and only if the channel satisfies a non-manipulable condition, which
can be easily checked. As a result, the non-manipulable condition provides us a clear-cut criterion to determine the detectability
of the aforementioned class of symbol manipulation attacks potentially conducted by the relay.
Index Terms
Maliciousness detection, symbol manipulation, amplify-and-forward relay, physical-layer security, trust metric valuation.
I. INTRODUCTION
It is a commonplace in many communication networks that no direct physical link exists between the source and destination
nodes of an information flow. Thus information needs to be relayed from the source to the destination through intermediate
nodes. This requirement brings forth a major security question: How is one able to ensure that the intermediate nodes faithfully
forward information from the source to the destination? Trust management [1]–[3] is a widely researched approach to address
this question. In essence, trust management pertains to the establishment, distribution, and maintenance of trust relationships
among nodes in a network. Based upon such relationships, it is expected that trusted nodes will faithfully operate according
to some protocols that they have agreed upon.
The aforementioned trust relationships are primarily quantified using trust metrics that are evaluated through nodes interacting
with and observing the behaviors of each other [4]–[9]. For nodes that do not directly interact with each other, trust relationships
can be established and maintained via inference [10]. It is clear that the valuation of trust metrics is critically important in
this trust management approach. Many different ways have been proposed to evaluate the trust metrics based on authentication
keys [11], [12], [13], reputation [14], [15], and evidence collected from network as well as physical interaction [16], [17],
[18]. Given the complexity and difficulty involved in quantifying the vague notion of trust, one would expect these valuation
schemes are naturally ad hoc.
To more systematically construct a trust metric, one needs to specify the class of malicious actions against which the metric
measures. In this paper, we consider a class of data manipulation attacks in which intermediate nodes may alter the channel
symbols that they are supposed to forward. We cast the trust metric valuation problem as a maliciousness detection problem
against this class of attacks. More precisely, a node (or another trusted node called a watchdog [19]) detects if another node
relays manipulated symbols that are different from those originally sent out by the node itself. Observations for detection
against the malicious attack can be made in the physical and/or higher layers.
Most existing maliciousness detection methods are key-based, requiring at the minimum the source and destination nodes
to share a secret key that is not privy to the relay node being examined. In [20], keys, which correspond to vectors in a
null space, are given to all nodes in a network. Any modification to the encrypted data by a relay node can be checked by
determining whether the observed data falls into the null space or not. In [21], symmetric cryptographic keys are applied to
the data at source and destination for the purpose of checking the maliciousness of relay node(s). Another key-based approach
is considered in [22] by measuring whether only a small amount of packets are dropped by relay nodes. In [23], a cross-layer
approach based on measurement of channel symbols is taken. Two keys are employed in that scheme; one to create a set
of known data and another to make the data indistinguishable from the key. When the destination receives the message, the
probability of error of the transmitted values of the key can be used to determine if the relay node is acting maliciously.
In all, the key-based maliciousness detection schemes described above are far from desirable as they require the support of
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2Fig. 1: Motivating example of a binary-input addition channel.
some key distribution mechanism, which in turn presumes the existence of inherently trusted nodes in the network. Moreover
some key-based methods have been shown insecure in [24] when nondeterminism and bit-level representation of the data is
considered.
For the class of symbol manipulation attacks, it is intuitive that maliciousness of a node should be detected by the nearby
nodes based on measurements obtained at the lower layers, since such measurements are more reliable than those made
by faraway nodes and at the higher layers as there are fewer chances for potential adversaries to tamper with the former
measurements. Hence we investigate the maliciousness detectability problem from a physical-layer perspective by considering
a model in which two sources want to share information through a potentially untrustworthy relay node that is supposed to
relay the information in the amplify-and-forward manner. In [25], we provide a preliminary study on the problem under a
restrictive case in which the relay may only modify the channel symbols based on some independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) attack model, and the source nodes can perfectly observe the symbols forwarded by the relay. In this paper, we extend
the treatment to a general channel model and an effectively general class of symbol manipulation attacks. The details of the
channel and attack models are provided in Section III.
In Section II, we qualitatively discuss maliciousness detectability in a simple binary-input addition channel in order to motivate
the detectability problem. This example has been presented in [25]. It is repeated here for easy reference. In Section IV, we
state our main result, which is a necessary and sufficient condition on the channel that guarantees asymptotic detection of
maliciousness individually by both source nodes using empirical distributions of their respective observations. We also provide
algorithms to check for the stated condition. The results presented in Section IV make clear that maliciousness detectability
under our model is a consequence of the stochastic characteristics of the channel and the sources. It works solely based on
observations made by the source nodes about the symbols sent by the relay node together with knowledge about the channel.
No presumed shared secret between any set of nodes is required or used. Thus the proposed maliciousness detection approach
can be used independent of or in conjunction with the key-based methods described above to provide another level of protection
against adversaries
The proofs of the results in Section IV are provided later in Section VI. In Section V, we present results from numerical
simulation studies of the addition channel example in Section II and other more complicated channels to illustrate the asymptotic
detectability results in Section IV with finite observations. Finally we draw a few conclusions about this work in Section VII.
II. MOTIVATING EXAMPLE
To motivate the maliciousness detectability model and results in later sections, let us first consider the simple binary-input
addition channel shown in Fig. 1, in which two source nodes (Alice & Bob) communicate to one another through a relay node
(Romeo) in discrete time instants. The source alphabets of Alice and Bob are both binary {0, 1}. The channel from Alice and
Bob to Romeo is defined by the summation of the symbols transmitted by Alice and Bob. Romeo is supposed to broadcast
his observed symbol, without modification, back to Alice and Bob. Both Alice and Bob observe the symbol transmitted by
Romeo perfectly. Thus the input and output alphabets of Romeo and the observation alphabets of both Alice and Bob are all
ternary {0, 1, 2}. Alice, for instance, can obtain Bob’s source symbol by subtracting her own source symbol from the symbol
transmitted by Romeo.
Now consider the possibility that Romeo may not faithfully forward the symbol that he observes to Alice and Bob in an
attempt to impede the communication between them. The main question that we are interested in is whether Alice and Bob
are able to discern, from their respective observed symbols, if Romeo is acting maliciously by forwarding symbols that are
different than those he has received. To proceed answering this question, let us first consider a single round of transmission,
i.e., Alice and Bob transmit their source symbols to Romeo and then Romeo broadcasts a symbol (may be different than what
he has received) back to Alice and Bob. Suppose that Alice sends a 0 and receives a 2 back from Romeo. Then it will be
3TABLE I: Possible outcomes of the system in Fig. 1.
Alice Bob Romeo Romeo Detection OutcomeIn Out
0 0 0
0 Not malicious
1 Not detected
2 Alice & Bob both detect
0 1 1
0 Bob detects
1 Not malicious
2 Alice detects
1 0 1
0 Alice detects
1 Not malicious
2 Bob detects
1 1 2
0 Alice & Bob both detect
1 Not detected
2 Not malicious
clear to her that Romeo must have modified what he has received. On the other hand, if Alice receives a 1 back, then she will
not be able to tell whether Romeo has acted maliciously or not. One can continue this line of simple deduction to obtain all
the possible outcomes in Table I. It is clear from the table that neither Alice nor Bob will be able to determine if Romeo is
malicious in general from a single round of transmission.
However the situation changes if Alice and Bob know the source distributions of one another and are allowed to decide
on the maliciousness of Romeo over multiple rounds of transmission. To further elaborate, suppose that the source symbols
of Bob and Alice are i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables with parameter 12 . Then the probabilities of the events that Romeo’s
input symbol takes on the values 0, 1, and 2 are 14 ,
1
2 , and
1
4 , respectively. In particular, out of many rounds of transmission
one would expect half of the symbols transmitted by Romeo be 1’s. From Table I, we see that for Romeo to be malicious
and remained undetected by neither Alice nor Bob, he can only change a 0 to a 1 and a 2 to a 1 in any single round of
transmission. But if he does so often, the number of 1’s that he sends out will be more than half of the number of transmission
rounds, as expected from normal operation. On the other hand, Romeo can fool one of Alice and Bob by changing a 1 to
either a 0 or 2. But he is not able to determine in each change whether Alice or Bob is fooled. Hence over many such changes
the probability of not being detected become decreasingly small. In summary, Alice and Bob may individually deduce any
maliciousness of Romeo by observing the distribution of Romeo’s output symbol conditioned on their respective own input
symbols. This capability is induced by the restrictions on what Romeo can do that are imposed by the characteristic of the
addition channel depicted in Fig. 1. It is important to notice that Alice and Bob do not need to possess any shared secret that
is not privy to Romeo.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Notation
Let a be a 1×m row vector and A be a m×n matrix. For i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and j = 1, 2, . . . , n, ai and [a]i both denote the
ith element of a, and Ai,j and [A]i,j both denote the (i, j)th element of A. Whenever there is no ambiguity, we will employ
the unbracketed notation for simplicity. Moreover, we write the ith row of A as Ai. Of course, [Ai]j = Ai,j . Let the transpose
of A be denoted by AT . Then the jth column of A is (ATj )
T . It is our convention that all column vectors are written as the
transposes of row vectors. For instance, a is a row vector and aT is a column vector. The L1-norm of a is ‖a‖1 =
∑m
i=1 |ai|,
while the Euclidean norm of a is ‖a‖2 =
√
aaT . The operation vec(A) vectorizes the matrix A by stacking its columns to
form a mn×1 column vector. We define ‖A‖1 , ‖vec(A)‖1 and ‖A‖2 , ‖vec(A)‖2. Note that ‖A‖2 is the Frobenius norm
of A. The identity and zero matrices of any dimension are denoted by the generic symbols I and 0, respectively.
Let X be a discrete random variable. We use |X| to denote the size of the alphabet of X . Our convention is to use the
corresponding lowercase letter to denote the elements in the alphabet of a random variable. For example, the alphabet of X
is {x1, x2, . . . , x|X|}. We denote the probability mass function (pmf) Pr(X = xj) by p(xj). In addition, let X and Y be two
discrete random variables. We denote the conditional pmf Pr(Y = yi|X = xj) by p(yi|xj) for simplicity. Let xN denote a
sequence of N symbols drawn from the alphabet of X . The counting function pi(xi;xN ) denotes the number of occurrences
of xi, the ith symbol in the alphabet of X as described above, in the sequence xN . Let 1n(xi;xN ) be the indicator function
of the condition that the nth symbol in the sequence xN is xi. Then we clearly have
pi(xi;x
N ) =
N∑
n=1
1n(xi;x
N ).
The counting function also trivially extends to give the number of occurrences of a tuple of symbols drawn from the
corresponding tuple of alphabets of random variables. For example, if xN and yN are length-N sequences of symbols drawn
4(a) Multiple-access channel (time instants 1, 2 . . . , N )
(b) Broadcast channel (time instants N + 1, N + 2, . . . , 2N )
Fig. 2: Amplify-and-forward relaying model.
from the alphabets of X and Y , respectively, then
pi(xi, yj ;x
N , yN ) =
N∑
n=1
1n(xi;x
N )1n(yj ; y
N ).
The set of typical X-sequences (e.g., [26, Definition 6.1]) is denoted by
TN[X],δ ,
xN :
|X|∑
i=1
∣∣∣∣ 1N pi(xi;xN )− p(xi)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ δ
 .
Whenever there is no confusion, we write for instance piN (xi) and 1Nn (xi) in place of pi(xi;x
N ) and 1n(xi;xN ), respectively,
to simplify notation. Finally, let us define the symbol indexing maps χn(xN ), n = 1, 2, . . . , N , by assigning the index value
j to χn(xN ) when the nth symbol in the sequence xN is xj , namely, the jth element in the alphabet of X .
B. Channel model
Consider the channel model shown in Fig. 2. This model serves as a generalization of the motivating example described
in Section I. Two nodes (1 and 2) simultaneously forward their source symbols to a relay node. The relay node is supposed
to forward its received symbols back to the two nodes (or to some other nodes) in the amplify-and-forward manner. There is
some possibility that the relay may modify its received symbols in an attempt to degrade the performance of the transmission.
Our goal is to determine if and when it is possible for nodes 1 and 2 to detect any malicious act of the relay by observing
the symbols broadcast from the relay in relation to the symbols that they individually transmitted. Note that the above model
also covers the perhaps more common scenario in which only one node has information to send while the transmission by the
other node is regarded as intentional interference.
More specifically, let X1 and X2 be two independent discrete random variables that specify the generic distributions of
the symbols transmitted by nodes 1 and 2, respectively. At time instants 1, 2, . . . , N , nodes 1 and 2 transmit i.i.d. symbols
respectively distributed according to X1 and X2. The transmission goes through a memoryless multiple-access channel (MAC)
with the random variable U describing its generic output symbol. The MAC is specified by the conditional pmf p(uk|x1,i, x2,j).
The relay node, during time instants 1, 2, . . . , N , observes the output symbols of the MAC, processes (or manipulates) them,
and then broadcasts the processed symbols out to nodes 1 and 2 at time instants N + 1, N + 2, . . . , 2N via a memoryless
broadcast channel (BC) with the random variables V describing its generic input symbol and Y1 and Y2 describing the generic
output symbols at nodes 1 and 2, respectively. The BC is specified by the conditional pmf p(y1,i, y2,j |vk). In addition, because
the relay is supposed to work in the amplify-and-forward manner, we adopt the reasonable model that the alphabets of U
and V are of the same size, and there is a one-to-one correspondence ui ↔ vi, i = 1, 2, . . . , |U |, between elements of the
alphabets.
5Let uN denote the sequence of N output symbols of the MAC observed by the relay during time instants 1, 2, . . . , N , and
vN denote the sequence of N input symbols of the BC transmitted by the relay during time instants N + 1, N + 2, . . . , 2N .
Then the mapping vN = φN (uN ) represents the manipulation performed by the relay. The manipulation map φN is allowed
to be arbitrary, deterministic or random, and known to neither node 1 nor 2. The only restriction we impose is the Markovity
condition that p(vN |uN , xN1 , xN2 ) = p(vN |uN ), where xN1 and xN2 denote the symbol sequences transmitted by nodes 1 and
2, respectively, during time instants 1, 2, . . . , N . That is, the relay may potentially manipulate the transmission based only on
the output symbols of the MAC that it observes.
C. Maliciousness of relay
Consider the |U |×|U | matrix ΦN whose (i, j)th element is defined by
ΦNi,j ,
piN (vi, uj)
piN (uj)
. (1)
It is obvious that ΦN is a stochastic matrix describing a valid conditional pmf of a fictitious channel, which we will refer
to as the attack channel. Despite omitted from its notation, the attack channel ΦN depends on the sequences uN and vN .
Rather than directly acting on the MAC output symbols to produce input symbols for the BC, the attack channel ΦN extracts
the statistical properties of the manipulation map φN that are relevant to our purpose of defining (and later detecting) the
maliciousness of the action of the relay:
Definition 1. (Maliciousness) The relay is said to be non-malicious if ‖ΦN − I‖1 → 0 in probability as N approaches infinity.
Otherwise, the relay is considered malicious.
In the strictest sense, normal amplify-and-forward relay operation should require ΦN = I for all uN and vN and for each N .
Nevertheless it turns out to be beneficial to consider the relaxation in Definition 1 when the primary focus is to check whether
the relay is degrading the channel rather than attacking a specific part of the transmission. In particular, the probabilistic and
limiting relaxation in Definition 1 allows us to obtain definite results (see Section IV) for the very general class of potential
manipulation maps described above by tolerating actions, such as manipulating only a negligible fraction of symbols, that have
essentially no effect on the information rate across the relay. We point out that it is possible to develop similar results based
on the above-mentioned strictest sense of maliciousness for some more restricted classes of manipulation maps (see [25] for
instance).
D. Maliciousness detection
Due to symmetry, it suffices to focus on node 1’s attempt to detect whether the relay is acting maliciously or not. To that
end, we are particularly interested in the “marginalized” MAC pmf p(ui|x1,j) and marginal BC pmf p(y1,i|vj). For better
bookkeeping, we will write the two conditional pmfs in terms of the |U |×|X1| matrix A and |Y1|×|U | matrix B whose
elements are respectively defined by
Ai,j , p(ui|x1,j)
Bi,j , p(y1,i|vj).
To complete the bookkeeping process, we define the |Y1|×|X1| matrix ΓN as
ΓN , BΦNA, (2)
which can be interpreted as the conditional pmf of the node 1’s observation if the relay were to act in an i.i.d. manner described
by the attack channel ΦN .
We assume that node 1 knows A and B. We will refer to the pair (A,B) as the observation channel for node 1, which may
use knowledge about the observation channel to detect any maliciousness of the relay. Justifications for this assumption can
be made based on applying knowledge of the physical MAC and BC in a game-theoretic argument similar to the one given in
[23]. Before data communication between the nodes and relay takes place, they must agree on a relaying protocol. During the
negotiation process of such protocol, the relay needs to either reveal A and B to the nodes, or provide assistant to the nodes to
learn A and B. If the relay provides false information about A and B corresponding to a more favorable channel environment
than the actual one, the nodes may use the knowledge of the physical channel to check against the false information. On the
other hand, it would also not be beneficial for the relay to misinform the nodes with a less favorable channel environment,
since in such case the nodes may simply decide not to use the relay.
We may also assume that A contains no all-zero rows and that p(x1,j) > 0 for all x1,j in the alphabet of X1. If these
assumptions do not hold, we can reinforce them by removing symbols from the alphabets of X1 and U and deleting the
corresponding rows and columns from A, without affecting the system model. In addition, note that relabeling of elements
in the alphabets of X1 and Y1 amounts to permuting the columns of A and rows of B, respectively. Relabelling of elements
6in the alphabet of U , and hence the corresponding elements in the alphabet of V , requires simultaneous permutation of the
rows of A and columns of B. It is obvious that all these relabellings, and hence the corresponding permutations of rows and
columns of A and B, do not change the underlying system model. Therefore we will implicitly assume any such convenient
permutations in the rest of the paper.
As mentioned before, detection of maliciousness of the relay is to be done during normal data transmission. That is, the
detection is based upon the symbols that node 1 transmits at time instants 1, 2, . . . , N (i.e., xN1 ) and the corresponding symbols
that node 1 receives at time instant N + 1, N + 2, . . . , 2N (i.e., yN1 ). We refer to each pair of such corresponding transmit and
receive symbols (e.g., the ones at time instants 1 and N + 1) as a single observation made by node 1. Node 1 is free however
to use its N observations to detect maliciousness of the relay. For instance, we may employ the following estimator of ΦN to
construct a decision statistic for maliciousness detection. First node 1 obtains the conditional histogram estimator ΓˆN of ΓN
defined by its (i, j)th element:
ΓˆNi,j ,
piN (y1,i, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
. (3)
Then it constructs the estimator ΦˆN from ΓˆN according to:
ΦˆN =
argmaxΦˆ∈Gµ(ΓˆN )‖Φˆ− I‖1 if Gµ(Γˆ
N ) is non-empty,
I otherwise.
(4)
In (4), µ is a small positive constant and Gµ(Γˆ) is the set of |U |×|U | stochastic matrices, for each of which (say denoted by
Φˆ), there exists a |Y1|×|U | stochastic matrix Γ˜ such that ‖ΠB(Γ˜− Γˆ)ΠA‖1 ≤ µ and BΦˆA = ΠBΓ˜ΠA, where ΠA and ΠB
denote the orthogonal projectors onto the row space of A and column space of B, respectively. We will employ the estimator
ΦˆN specified in (4) to obtain the detectability results in the following sections.
IV. MALICIOUSNESS DETECTABILITY
To describe the main results of this paper, we first need to introduce the following notions of normalized, balanced, and
polarized vectors:
Definition 2. (Normalized vector) A non-zero vector ω is said to be normalized if ‖ω‖1 = 1.
Definition 3. (Balanced vector) A vector ω is said to be balanced if
∑
i ωi = 0.
Definition 4. (Polarized vectors) For b ≥ 0 and 0 ≤  ≤ b, a vector ω is said to be (b, )-polarized at j if
ωi ∈
{
[b,∞) for i = j
(−∞, ] for i 6= j.
Further ω is said to be (b, )-double polarized at (j, k) if
ωi ∈

[b,∞) for i = j
(−∞,−b] for i = k
[−, ] for i 6= j, k.
A. Main result
The main result of this paper is that detectability of maliciousness of the relay is characterized by the following categorization
of observation channels:
Definition 5. (Manipulable observation channel) The observation channel (A,B) is manipulable if there exists a |U |×|U |
non-zero matrix Υ, whose jth column, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |, is balanced and (0, 0)-polarized at j, with the property that
all columns of ΥA are in the right null space of B. Otherwise, (A,B) is said to be non-manipulable.
Let DN = DN (yN1 , x
N
1 ) denote a decision statistic based on the first N observations (y
N
1 , x
N
1 ) that is employed for
maliciousness detection. The following theorem states that maliciousness detectability is equivalent to non-manipulablility of
the observation channel:
Theorem 1. (Maliciousness detectability) When and only when the observation channel (A,B) is non-manipulable, there
exists a sequence of decision statistics {DN} with the following properties (assuming δ > 0 below):
1) If lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) > 0, then
lim sup
N→∞
Pr
(
DN > δ
∣∣∣ ‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 1.
72) If lim infN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ) > 0, then
lim
N→∞
Pr
(
DN > cδ
∣∣∣ ‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ) = 0
for some positive constant c that depends only on A and B.
The theorem verifies the previous claim that the attack channel ΦN provides us the required statistical characterization
for distinguishing between malicious and non-malicious amplify-and-forward relay. In addition, as shown in the proof of the
theorem to be provided later in Section VI-C this distinguishability is (asymptotically) observable through the decision statistic
‖ΦˆN − I‖1, where ΦˆN is the estimator of ΦN described in (4), for non-manipulable channels. The requirement of (A,B)
being non-manipulable is not over-restrictive and is satisfied in many practical scenarios.
Theorem 1 can further be employed to characterize detectability of maliciousness of the relay in the context of Definition 1:
Corollary 1. Given that (A,B) is non-manipulable, the sequence of decision statistics {DN} in Theorem 1 also satisfies the
following properties:
1) If the relay is not malicious (i.e., ‖ΦN − I‖1 → 0 in probability), then
lim
N→∞
Pr(DN > δ) = 0
for any δ > 0.
2) If the relay is malicious (i.e., ‖ΦN − I‖1 does not converge to 0 in probability), then
lim sup
N→∞
Pr(DN > δ) ≥ lim sup
N→∞
Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ)
for any δ > 0.
3) If the relay is malicious and there is a subsequence {ΦNM } of attack channels satisfying ‖ΦNM − Φ‖1 → 0 in probability
for some stochastic Φ 6= I , then there exists δ > 0 such that lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 1, and for every such
δ,
lim sup
N→∞
Pr(DN > δ) = 1.
4) If the relay is malicious with ‖ΦN − Φ‖1 → 0 in probability for some stochastic Φ 6= I , then there exists δ > 0 such
that limN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 1, and for every such δ,
lim
N→∞
Pr(DN > δ) = 1.
Note that Properties 1 and 2 of the corollary together state that DN → 0 in probability when and only when the relay in
not malicious. Properties 3 and 4 provide progressively stronger maliciousness detection differentiation when more restrictions
are placed on the attack channel ΦN .
B. Checking for non-manipulability
The manipulability of the observation channel (A,B) can be checked by solving a linear program as shown below:
Algorithm 1. (Non-manipulable?)
1) Let Ω, ν, and λ be a |X1|×|Y1| matrix-valued variable and two 1×|U | vector-valued variables, respectively.
2) Solve the following linear program:
min
λ,ν,Ω
|U |∑
k=1
λk − νk − [AΩB]k,k
subject to
1− λk ≤ 0 k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
νk + [AΩB]k,k − λk ≤ 0 k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
νk + [AΩB]k,l ≤ 0 k 6= l = 1, 2, . . . , |U |.
3) If the optimal value in 2) is 0, then conclude that (A,B) is non-manipulable. Otherwise (i.e., the optimal value is
positive), conclude that (A,B) is manipulable.
For cases where the right null space of B is trivial, checking manipulability of (A,B) is made simple by Theorem 2 below.
For notation clarity in expressing the theorem, let us define the following constants that depend only on A:
Amin , min
i
∑
j
Ai,j
amin ,
Amin
|U | (|X1|+Amin) .
8Note that both Amin and amin are positive since A does not contain any all-zero row.
Theorem 2. Suppose that the right null space of B is trivial. Then (A,B) is non-manipulable if and only if the left null space
of A does not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vectors.
We remark that the condition of non-existence of normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vectors in the left null space of A
is relatively easy to check by for instance employing the following algorithm:
Algorithm 2. (Double polarized vector in left null space?) Let n = |U | − rank(A). The following steps can be employed to
check whether the left null space of A contains any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vectors:
1) If n = 0, then the left null space of A must not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector.
2) If n = |U | − 1, then the left null space of A must contain a normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector.
3) If 1 ≤ n ≤ |U | − 2:
a) Find a n×|U | matrix Υ whose rows form a basis for the left null space of A.
b) Perform elementary row operations, permuting columns if necessary, to make Υ into the row-reduced echelon form
Υ = (I Υ˜), where Υ˜ is a n×(|U | − n) block.
c) For each i = 1, 2, . . . , n, if all elements of Υ˜i, except for a single negative element, are zero, then go to 3f).
d) For each i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and i 6= j, if Υ˜i = cΥ˜j for some c > 0, then go to 3f).
e) Conclude that the left null space of A does not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector, and
terminate.
f) Conclude that the left null space of A contains a normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector.
Practically speaking, the triviality of the right null space of B guarantees that the pmf of V can be unambiguously obtained
by node 1 from observing Y1. This requirement is reasonable if node 1 is expected to be able to observe the behavior of the
relay, and is often satisfied in practical scenarios. The requirement of the left null space of A not containing any normalized
double-polarized vector is not over-restrictive, and can be satisfied in many cases by adjusting the source distribution of node 2.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
A. Motivating example
To illustrate the use of Theorem 1, let us first reconsider the motivating example in Section II. In the notation of Section III-B,
X1 and X2 have the same binary alphabet {0, 1}, and the MAC is the binary erasure MAC described by U = X1 +X2. That
is, the alphabets of U and V are both {0, 1, 2}. The BC is ideal defined by Y1 = V and Y2 = V . In addition, we assume
the usual equally likely source distributions, i.e., X1 and X2 are i.i.d. equally likely binary random variables. Physically, this
model approximates the scenario in which two equal-distance Ethernet nodes send signals (collision) to a bridge node, or the
scenario in which two power-controlled wireless nodes send phase synchronized signals (collision) to an access point. In both
scenarios, the signal-to-noise ratio is assumed to be high.
It is easy to check that in this case
A =
.5 0.5 .5
0 .5
 and B = I3×3.
Hence Amin = 12 , amin =
1
15 , and bmin =
1
12 . Note that the left null space of A has dimension 1, and the row-reduced echelon
basis matrix in Algorithm 2 is (1 − 1 1). Thus Algorithm 2 gives the fact that the left null space of A does not contain
any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector. By Theorem 1 and its proof in Section VI, we know that the sequence of
decision statistics {‖ΦˆN − I‖1}, where ΦˆN is described in (4), satisfies properties 1) and 2) stated in Theorem 1. Thus any
malicious relay manipulation is detectable asymptotically.
1) I.i.d. attacks: To demonstrate the asymptotic maliciousness detection performance promised by Theorem 1, and to
investigate the performance with finite observations, we performed simulations for four different manipulation maps which
correspond to the relay randomly and independently switching its input symbol by symbol according to the conditional pmfs
p(vj |ui) specified by the matrices
Φ1 = I3×3, Φ2 =
 .99 .005 .005.005 .99 .005
.005 .005 .99
 ,
Φ3 =
.99 .005 0.01 .99 .01
0 .005 .99
 , and Φ4 =
.99 0 0.01 1 .01
0 0 .99
 . (5)
Obviously the case of Φ1 corresponds to a non-malicious relay and the other cases correspond to a malicious relay. The
particular malicious Φ’s were chosen to represent different ways a relay node may choose to attack. For the case of Φ2, the
9(a) i.i.d attacks, N = 103 (b) i.i.d attacks, N = 104
(c) i.i.d attacks, N = 105 (d) non-ergodic attacks, N = 105
Fig. 3: Plot of empirical cdfs of ‖ΦˆN − I‖1 obtained in the motivating example with the four relay manipulation maps
corresponding to Φ1 = I,Φ2, Φ3, and Φ4 respectively.
relay node changes 1% of the symbols received without regards to whether or not this will make the manipulation obvious to
the source nodes. In contrast, the attack of Φ3 is more reserved in what it will do. It can be seen that the relay’s manipulation
can only be instantly detected by one of the source nodes at any given transmitted value. That is, the relay the relay switches
1% of the received symbols in ways listed out in Table. I except those labeled with “Alice & Bob both detect.” Finally the
attack of Φ4 is the most cautious and will only take an action that neither source node can recognize as manipulation without
looking at multiple observations. For this case, the relay switches 2% of the received symbols with values 0 or 2 to 1. This
corresponds to the “Not detected” outcomes in Table I. Note that ‖ΦN − Φi‖1 → 0 in probability as N → ∞ in each case.
Hence property 1) of Corollary 1 applies for the case of Φ1 and property 4) applies for the cases of Φ2, Φ3, and Φ4.
In different simulation runs, we set N = 103, 104, and 105. Five thousand trials were run in each simulation. The empirical
cumulative distribution functions (cdfs) of ‖ΦˆN − I‖1 obtained from the 5000 trials for each simulation are plotted in Figs. 3a,
3b, and 3c for the cases of N = 103, 104, and 105, respectively. For these three cases, the values of µ chosen in defining the
estimator ΦˆN are 0.2, 0.1, and 0.05, respectively. From Figs. 3b and 3c respectively with N = 104 and N = 105, as predicted
by parts 1) and 4) of Corollary 1, the decision statistic ‖ΦˆN − I‖1 succeeds in differentiating between the non-malicious case
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A =

1
3 0 0
1
3
1
3 0
1
3
1
3
1
3
0 13
1
3
0 0 13
 , B =

1 .5 0 0 0
0 .5 .7 0 0
0 0 .3 .5 0
0 0 0 .5 1
 , Φ1 = I5×5, Φ2 =

.99 .0025 .0025 .0025 .0025
.0025 .99 .0025 .0025 .0025
.0025 .0025 .99 .0025 .0025
.0025 .0025 .0025 .99 .0025
.0025 .0025 .0025 .0025 .99
 ,
Φ3 =

.99 .013 .0025 0 0
.005 .99 .0025 .013 0
.005 .013 .99
.01
3 .005
0 .013 .0025 .99 .005
0 0 .0025 .013 .99
 , and Φ4 =

.985 0 0 0 0
.0075 .985 0 0 0
.0075 .015 1 .015 .0075
0 0 0 .985 .0075
0 0 0 0 .985
 . (6)
(a) (A,B) non-manipulable (b) (A,B) manipulable
Fig. 4: Plot of empirical cdfs of ‖ΦˆN − I‖1 for various i.i.d. attacks considered in Sections V-B and V-C.
of Φ1 and the malicious cases of Φ2, Φ3, and Φ4 with very high confidence. For instance, by selecting the decision threshold
at δ = 0.065 and δ = 0.004 respectively for the cases of N = 104 and N = 105, we are able to obtain very small miss
and false alarm probabilities for detecting maliciousness of the relay. For N = 103, we can see from Fig. 3a that there is
still differentiation between the empirical cdfs obtained for the non-malicious and malicious cases. However the maliciousness
differentiation confidence achieved is much weaker than the detectors with the larger value of N . This simulation exercise
illustrates the fact that the decision statistic based on the maximum-norm estimator of (4), while is convenient for proving the
asymptotic distinguishability result in Theorem 1, may not be a suitable choice for constructing a practical detector when the
number of observations, N , is not large. Other more efficient finite-observation detectors may be needed.
2) Non-ergodic attacks: To demonstrate part 2) of Corollary 1 with non-i.i.d attacks, we simulated a few non-ergodic
attacks and considered again the decision statistic ‖ΦˆN − I‖1. In these non-ergodic attacks, the relay decides whether or not
to manipulate the symbols depending on if the checksum of all observed symbols is even or not. Conditioning on an even
checksum, the relay manipulates the symbols i.i.d. according to Φ2, Φ3, and Φ4 as described in (5). Note that the for these
attacks, limN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 0.5 for all δ > 0.
The results for this simulation with N = 105 and µ = 0.01 are plotted in Fig. 3d. From the figure, the first important note is
that the empirical cdfs of the decision statistic exhibit staircase shapes with a step at 0.5 as predicted by part 2) of Corollary 1.
When the relay is being malicious, it is clear that by choosing δ = 0.07, we can again obtain small miss and false alarm
probabilities for detecting maliciousness of the relay.
B. Higher order example
Let us consider the addition channel as shown in Fig. 1 with both Alice and Bob choosing their source symbols uniformly
over the ternary alphabet {0, 1, 2} instead. Hence the input and output alphabets of Romeo is {0, 1, 2, 3, 4} in this case. It is
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easy to verify that the corresponding A matrix is given as in (6) on the next page. Furthermore, suppose that BC from Romeo
back to Alice and Bob is not ideal. In particular, let us model the marginal BC from Romeo back to Alice by the matrix B
given in (6). Notice that this B has a non-trivial right null space.
First we need to determine if the pair (A,B) is non-manipulable. To do this, we used the Algorithm 1 presented in
Section IV-B. In particular, we employed the linear programming solver linprog in the optimization toolbox in MATLAB
to solve the linear program in step 2 of Algorithm 1. The optimal value returned was of the order of 10−16, which is close
enough to 0 for us to decide (A,B) as non-manipulable. Thus again Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 apply to give that the decision
statistic ‖ΦˆN − I‖1 provides maliciousness detectability for this channel.
As in Section V-A1, we simulated i.i.d. attacks by Romeo. The four different Φ’s shown in (6) were the cases that we
considered in the simulation study. The attack of Φ1 corresponds to the case in which Romeo truthfully forwards the received
symbols. For the attacks of Φ2, Φ3, and Φ4, Romeo alters 1% of the symbols that it receives. Each of these three cases was
once again chosen for a particular level of maliciousness as in Section V-A1. The case of Φ2 corresponds to an attack in which
Romeo returns values that he knows will instantly guarantee detection. The attack of Φ3 only sends back values for which it
is possible to not be instantly detected. Finally Φ4 corresponds to the case in which Romeo is the most cautious, and will not
send back any symbol which is instantly detectable.
The empirical cdfs of ‖ΦˆN − I‖1 obtained for the four different Φi’s are plotted in Fig. 4a for the simulation run with
N = 105 and µ = 0.05. As before, by choosing a decision threshold at δ = 0.07 we can obtain very small miss and false
alarm probabilities for detecting maliciousness of Romeo.
C. Counter-example
To demonstrate the consequence of having a manipulable observation channel (A,B), reconsider the ternary-input example
of Section V-B with the marginal BC from Romeo back to Alice specified by the following matrix
B =

1 0 0 0 0
0 .5 0 .3 .2
0 0 .5 .2 .3
0 .3 .2 .5 0
0 .2 .3 0 .5
 .
To check whether (A,B) is manipulable, Algorithm 1 was again employed. The optimal value of the linear program in step 2
obtained was 3, thus alerting us that (A,B) is manipulable. Indeed it can be readily check that for any ψ ∈ (0, 1], the matrix
Υ =

0 0 0 0 0
0 ψ 0 0 0
0 0 ψ 0 −ψ
0 −ψ 0 0 0
0 0 −ψ 0 ψ
 ,
is one that satisfies BΥA = 0 required in Definition 5 to make (A,B) manipulable. Therefore Theorem 1 tells us that
maliciousness detectability is impossible for this channel.
As in Sections V-A1 and V-B, an i.i.d. attack with Φ2 = I − Υ was simulated for N = 105 and µ = 0.05. The value
of ψ = 1 was chosen in the simulation. This choice corresponds to an average of 59 of the symbols are changed by Romeo.
Clearly having this many symbols changed would be catastrophic in most practical communication systems, and is therefore
undesirable. The empirical cdfs of the non-malicious case and the malicious case of Φ2 obtained from the simulation are plotted
in Fig. 4b. It is clear from the figure that the cases for which Romeo is being malicious and not malicious are indistinguishable.
Hence the severe attack of Φ2 can not be detected.
VI. PROOFS OF DETECTABILITY RESULTS
In order to prove the various results in Section IV, we will need to extend the notion of polarization of vectors given in
Definition 4 to matrices:
Definition 6. (Polarized matrices) Let 1 ≤ n ≤ |U |. For b ≥ 0 and 0 ≤  ≤ b, we say that a n×|U | matrix Υ is (b, )-polarized
if
Υi,j ∈
{
[b,∞) for j = i
(−∞, ] for j 6= i.
If, in addition, Υi,j = 0 for all i, j = 1, 2, . . . , n and i 6= j, we say that Υ is (b, )-diagonal polarized.
Moreover, by saying a normalized Υ is in the left null space of A, we mean all rows of Υ are normalized vectors in the
left null space of A.
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In addition to the notion of polarized vectors and matrices, we will also employ the following generalization of linear
dependence:
Definition 7. (s-dependent) A vector ω is s-dependent (s ≥ 0) upon a set of vectors Υ1,Υ2, . . . ,Υn of the same dimension
if there exists a set of coefficients c1, c2, . . . , cn such that∥∥∥∥∥ω −
n∑
i=1
ciΥi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ s.
With these definitions in place, we will first establish a few important and interesting properties of polarized vectors and
matrices in the left and right null spaces of A and B, respectively. In addition, we will show that the condition of the observation
channel (A,B) being non-manipulable is sufficient in guaranteeing the validity of these properties. Then we will apply some
of these properties to bound the distance between an estimate of the attack channel and the true attack channel. The distance
bound is employed to show that a decision statistic constructed from an attack channel estimator based on histogram estimation
of node 1’s conditional pmf of its received symbols given its transmitted symbols provides the needed convergence properties
in Theorem 1. The aforementioned properties of polarized vectors in the left null space of A will also be used to prove
Algorithm 2 and Theorem 2.
A. Properties concerning polarized vectors and matrices in null spaces of A and B
Let us first study the left null space of A. The following simple lemma about normalized vectors in the left null space of
A is critical to many other results in this section:
Lemma 1. Suppose that υ is a non-zero normalized 1×|U | vector in the left null space of A. Then υ must contain at least
one positive element and one negative element, and
max
i:υi>0
υi ≥ amin
min
i:υi<0
υi ≤ −amin.
Proof: Write a = maxi:υi>0 υi for convenience, and note that a = 0 by definition if υ contains no positive element. Since
υ is normalized, we have ∑
i:υi≤0
|υi| = 1−
∑
i:υi>0
|υi| ≥ 1− a|U |. (7)
Because υ is in the left null space of A,
∑
i υiAi,j = 0 for all j. That implies∑
i:υi>0
υiAi,j = −
∑
i:υi≤0
υiAi,j =
∑
i:υi≤0
|υi|Ai,j . (8)
But, because 0 ≤ Ai,j ≤ 1, we can make the following inequality∑
i:υi>0
υiAi,j ≤
∑
i:υi>0
υi ≤ a|U |.
Substituting (8) back in, we get
a|U | ≥
∑
i:υi≤0
|υi|Ai,j
which must hold for all j. Therefore,
a|U ||X1| ≥
∑
j
∑
i:υi≤0
|υi|Ai,j ≥
∑
i:υi≤0
|υi|Amin
which causes a contradiction when a = 0 since Amin > 0. Hence, a must not be 0, and υ must have at least one positive
element. Further, by (7),
a|U ||X1| ≥ Amin (1− a|U |)
which gives the desired lower bound on a. The proof of existence of a negative element and the fact that the minimum negative
element must be no larger than −amin is similar.
An immediate, but important later in proving Theorem 5, consequence of the lemma is the following observation:
Lemma 2. Let 0 <  ≤ amin. Suppose that ω is a normalized vector in the left null space of A that is not (amin, )-polarized
at i. Then there exists a j 6= i such that ωj ≥ .
Proof: Since ω is normalized, ωk ≥ amin for some k by Lemma 1. If k 6= i, then we have the stated conclusion. Now
suppose k = i. If ωj <  for all j 6= i, then we obtain the contradictory conclusion that ω is (amin, )-polarized at i.
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Lemma 1 also implies the following two lemmas about normalized, diagonal polarized matrices in the left null space of A:
Lemma 3. Let amin ≤ a ≤ 1 and 2 ≤ n ≤ |U |. Let 0 ≤ s < amin, and  and n−1 be two positive constants. Define
′n =
+ s
amin − s + (n− 1)
+ n−1 + s + sn−1
a(amin − s) . (9)
Suppose that s, , and n−1 are chosen small enough to satisfy ′n < amin. Furthermore, suppose that the left null space of A
contains a normalized, (a, n−1)-diagonal polarized, (n−1)×|U | matrix and a normalized, 1×|U | vector that is (a, )-polarized
at n, and is s-dependent on the rows of the matrix. Then the left null space of A also contains a normalized, 1×|U | vector
that is (amin, ′)-double polarized at (m,n) for all ′n ≤ ′ < amin, where m < n.
Proof: Fix ′ ∈ [′n, amin). Let Υ and υ be the (a, n−1)-diagonal polarized matrix and the (a, )-polarized vector,
respectively, given in the statement of the lemma. We will show that one row of Υ must be (amin, ′)-double polarized at
(m,n), where m < n.
First, since υ is s-dependent upon the rows in Υ, we know that there exists a set of coefficients c1, c2, . . . , cn−1 such that
for any j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
υj − s ≤
n−1∑
i=1
ciΥi,j ≤ υj + s. (10)
In particular, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, we have υi − s ≤ ciΥi,i ≤ υi + s. Using the facts that Υi,i ≥ a and that −1 ≤ υi ≤ ,
we can determine that −1− s
a
≤ ci ≤ + s
a
. (11)
From Lemma 1, we know that there exists an index m such that υm ≤ −amin. To proceed, we want to show that m < n,
which we will do through contradiction. Obviously m 6= n. Suppose m > n and consider (10) with j = m. Separating the
terms with positive and negative ci’s in the summation and using the upper bound in (10), we have∑
i:ci<0
|ci|Υi,m ≥ −υm − s +
∑
i:ci>0
ciΥi,m
≥ amin − s − (n− 1)+ s
a
(12)
where the second inequality is obtained by using the upper bound on ci in (11). But because m > n, we have Υi,m ≤ n−1.
Then by using the lower bound on ci in (11), we get
∑
i:ci<0
|ci|Υi,m ≤ (n− 1)n−1 1+sa . Thus we arrive at the conclusion
that
(n− 1)n−1 1 + s
a
≥ amin − s − (n− 1)+ s
a
,
which clearly violates the condition ′n < amin in the statement of the lemma. Therefore m < n. Furthermore we have
cmΥm,m ≤ υm + s ≤ −amin + s < 0, which implies cm < 0 and |cm| ≥ amin − s.
Similar to (12), we have, for j > n, ∑
i:ci<0
|ci|Υi,j ≥ −υj − s +
∑
i:ci>0
ciΥi,j
≥ −− s − (n− 1)+ s
a
(13)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that υj ≤ . Further separating the terms with positive and negative Υi,j in the
sum on the left side of (13), for j > n, we have∑
i:ci<0,Υi,j<0
|ci||Υi,j |
≤ + s + (n− 1)+ s
a
+
∑
i:ci<0,Υi,j>0
|ci|Υi,j
≤ + s + (n− 1)+ n−1 + s + sn−1
a
(14)
where the second inequality results from the bound
∑
i:ci<0,Υi,j>0
|ci|Υi,j ≤ (n − 1)n−1 1+sa , as shown above. Because
cm < 0, we know from (14) that if Υm,j < 0, then |cm||Υm,j | ≤  + s + (n − 1) +n−1+s+sn−1a . Further, by the above
derived result that |cm| ≥ amin − s, we get
|Υm,j | ≤ + s
amin − s + (n− 1)
+ n−1 + s + sn−1
a(amin − s) = 
′
n,
if Υm,j < 0. Therefore, |Υm,j | ≤ ′ for all j > n.
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Combining all above results, we observe that Υm,m ≥ a, |Υm,j | ≤ ′ < amin for j > n, and Υm,j = 0 for all other index
values of j except n. From Lemma 1, we must have Υm,n ≤ −amin. Thus Υm is (amin, ′)-double polarized at (m,n).
Lemma 4. Let amin ≤ a ≤ 1 and 2 ≤ n ≤ |U |. Let 0 < s < amin, and  and n−1 be two positive constants. Define
′′n =
n−1
a
+
1
aminas
[
+ (n− 1)+ n−1
a
]
. (15)
Suppose that  and n−1 are chosen small enough to satisfy ′′n < amin. Furthermore, suppose that the left null space of A
contains a normalized, (a, n−1)-diagonal polarized, (n−1)×|U | matrix and a normalized, 1×|U | vector that is (a, )-polarized
at n, and is not s-dependent on the rows of the matrix. Then the left null space of A contains a normalized, (amin, ′′)-diagonal
polarized, n×|U | matrix, for all ′′n ≤ ′′ < amin.
Proof: Fix ′′ ∈ [′′n, amin). Let Υ and υ be the (a, n−1)-diagonal polarized matrix and the (a, )-polarized vector,
respectively, given in the statement of the lemma. We will first construct a normalized, 1×|U | vector υˆ that is (amin, ′′)-
polarized at n with the additional property that υˆj = 0 for all j = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Then we apply elementary row operations
and normalization to the rows of [ΥT υˆT ]T to obtain the desired normalized, n×|U |, (amin, ′′)-diagonal polarized matrix.
First, set
υ˜ = υ −
n−1∑
i=1
υi
Υi,i
Υi.
Because υ is not s-dependent upon the rows of Υ, we must have ‖υ˜‖1 > s. Hence we can normalize υ˜ to obtain υˆ, i.e.,
υˆ = υ˜/‖υ˜‖1. Clearly, for j < n, υ˜j = υj − υjΥj,j Υj,j = 0, which implies υˆj = 0. For j > n, write
υ˜j = υj −
∑
i:υi>0
υi
Υi,i
Υi,j +
∑
i:υi<0
|υi|
Υi,i
Υi,j . (16)
But since Υi,i ≥ a and υj ≤  for j > n, we have∑
i:υi>0
υi
Υi,i
Υi,j ≥
∑
i:υi>0

a
(−1) ≥ −(n− 1) 
a∑
i:υi<0
|υi|
Υi,i
Υi,j ≤
∑
i:υi<0
1
a
n−1 ≤ (n− 1)n−1
a
.
Applying these two bounds to (16), we get, for j > n,
υ˜j ≤ + (n− 1)+ n−1
a
,
which implies
υˆj ≤ 1
s
[
+ (n− 1)+ n−1
a
]
, ε ≤ ′′n.
Further, note that υˆ is a normalized vector in the left null space of A. Hence by Lemma 1 and the fact that ′′n < amin,
υˆn ≥ amin. Therefore υˆ is (amin, ε)-polarized at n with the additional property that υˆj = 0 for j < n as claimed.
Next, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n− 1, set
Υ˜i = Υi − Υi,n
υˆn
υˆ.
Clearly, Υ˜i,n = 0 and Υ˜i,j = Υi,j for j < n by design. Thus ‖Υ˜i‖1 ≥ a. Again, we can normalize Υ˜i to get Υˆi = Υ˜i/‖Υ˜i‖1.
Now, consider j > n,
Υ˜i,j = Υi,j − Υi,n
υˆn
υˆj ≤ n−1 + max{n−1, ε}
amin
= n−1 +
ε
amin
where the second inequality is due to −1 ≤ Υi,n ≤ n−1, −1 ≤ υˆj ≤ ε, and υˆn ≥ amin, and the last equality results from the
fact that |U |s < 1. Hence
Υˆi,j ≤ n−1
a
+
ε
amina
= ′′n.
As discussed before, Υˆi,j = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1 and j 6= i ≤ n. Hence, again using Lemma 1, we must have
Υˆi,i ≥ amin since ′′ < amin. Finally, set Υˆn = υˆ. The matrix Υˆ composed by using Υˆ1, Υˆ2, . . . , Υˆn as rows is the desired
(amin, 
′′)-diagonal polarized matrix.
To apply Lemmas 3 and 4, we need to the following lemma to select n:
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Lemma 5. Let s and  be two positive constants. Suppose that 2 ≤ n ≤ |U |. Define a˜n−1 , a2min
(
1 + n−1amin
)−1
. Set
i = 
(
2
a˜n−1s
)i−1
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. If
s < a
2
mina˜n−1
{
a2min
[
1 +
(
amina˜n−1
2
)n−1]
+ (n− 1)(1 + amin)
a˜2n−1
2
+ amina˜n−1
}−1
(17)
and  < amin
(
a˜n−1s
2
)n−1
, then
1) 1 ≤ 2 ≤ · · · ≤ n < amin,
2) ′i < amin, i = 2, 3, . . . , n,
3) ′′i ≤ i, i = 2, 3, . . . , n,
where ′i and 
′′
i are obtained from i−1 using the formulas given in (9) and (15) with a ≥ amin, respectively.
Proof: Part 1) is obvious from the construction. From (9) and 1), we have ′2 ≤ ′3 ≤ . . . ≤ ′n. Thus it suffices to show
′n < amin when establishing 2). Indeed, note that n−1 <
amina˜n−1
2 s, which together with (9) imply
′n ≤
1
(amin − s)a˜n−1
{
a2min
[
s + amin
(
a˜n−1s
2
)n−1]
+ (n− 1)(1 + s)
a˜2n−1s
2
}
≤ s
(amin − s)a˜n−1
{
a2min
[
1 +
(
amina˜n−1
2
)n−1]
+ (n− 1)(1 + amin)
a˜2n−1
2
}
< amin
where the last two inequalities result from the upper bound imposed on s in the statement of the lemma.
Finally, it is easy to see from (15) that, for i = 2, 3, . . . , n,
′′i ≤
1
a˜n−1s
(i−1 + ) ≤ 2i−1
a˜n−1s
= i
where the second inequality is due to 1).
Inductively applying Lemmas 3 and 4 with the choice of n from Lemma 5, we obtain the following theorem:
Theorem 3. Let 2 ≤ n ≤ |U |. Suppose that s, , and 1, 2, . . . , n are chosen according to Lemma 5, and that the left null
space of A contains a normalized, (amin, )-polarized, n× |U | matrix. Then the left null space contains either a normalized,
(amin, 
′
i)-double polarized, 1×|U | vector for some i = 2, 3, . . . , n, or a normalized, (amin, n)-diagonal polarized, n×|U |
matrix. In the latter case, no row in the original (amin, )-polarized matrix can be s-dependent upon the other rows.
Proof: Let Υ be the original (amin, )-polarized matrix in the left null space of A given in the statement of the theorem.
We will construct the desired (amin, ′i)-double polarized vector or (amin, n)-diagonal polarized matrix by inductively applying
Lemmas 3 and 4 to the rows of Υ.
First, set Υˆ(1) to be the first row of Υ. The assumption of the theorem guarantees that Υˆ(1) satisfies that requirement of
being a normalized, (amin, 1)-diagonal polarized, 1×|U | matrix in the left null space of A. Inductively, suppose that we have
constructed, from the first (i− 1) rows of Υ, the (i− 1)×|U | normalized matrix Υˆ(i−1) that is (amin, i−1)-diagonal polarized
and in the left null space of A. If the ith row of Υ is s-dependent on the rows of Υˆ(i−1) (i.e., the first (i−1) rows of Υ), then
by Lemmas 3 and 5, there exists a normalized, (amin, ′i)-double polarized (at (m, i) with m < i), 1×|U | vector in the left
null space of A. In this case, the induction process terminates. On the other hand, if the ith row of Υ is not s-dependent on
the rows of Υ(i−1), then Lemmas 4 and 5 together give an normalized i×|U | matrix Υˆ(i) that is (amin, i)-diagonal polarized
and in the left null space of A. Also note that the rows of Υˆ(i) are in the span of the first i rows of Υ. The induction process
continues until i = n.
Theorem 3 leads to the following result that is critical to development in the next section:
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Corollary 2. Fix 2 ≤ n ≤ |U |, a positive s satisfying (17), and a
2
mins
(amin−s)a˜n−1 < 
′ < amin. Let the left null space of A
contain no normalized (amin, ′)-double polarized, 1×|U | vector. Then there exists a positive  that if the left null space of A
contains a normalized, (amin, )-polarized n×|U | matrix, no row of such matrix can be s-dependent upon the other rows.
Proof: For i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, choose i = 
(
2
a˜n−1s
)i−1
as in Lemma 5. For any δ > 0, from (9), there exists a
small enough  such that ′n ≤ a
2
mins
(amin−s)a˜n−1 + δ. Choosing δ = 
′ − a2mins(amin−s)a˜n−1 and using part 1) of Lemma 5 give us
′2 ≤ ′3 ≤ . . . ≤ ′n ≤ ′. Now applying Theorem 3 gives us the desired result.
The next lemma states that the observation channel (A,B) being non-manipulable is sufficient for the condition of non-
existence of any normalized (amin, ′)-double polarized, 1×|U | vector in the left null space of A required in Corollary 2:
Lemma 6. If (A,B) is non-manipulable, then there exists a pair of constants s and A respectively satisfying
0 < s < min
1≤n≤|U |−1
a2mina˜n
{
a2min
[
1 +
(
amina˜n
2
)n]
+ n(1 + amin)
a˜2n
2
+ amina˜n
}−1
, (18)
a2mins
(amin − s)a˜|U |−1 < A < amin, (19)
such that the left null space of A does not contain any normalized, (amin, A)-double polarized vectors.
Proof: First we claim that the left null space of A can not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector if
(A,B) is non-manipulable. Indeed, suppose on the contrary that ω is a normalized vector in the left null space of A that is
(amin, 0)-double polarized at (α, β). Construct the |U |×1 column vector (ΥTα)T whose αth element is ωα, βth elements is
−ωα, and all other elements are zero. Similarly, construct the |U |×1 column vector (ΥTβ )T whose αth element is ωβ , βth
elements is −ωβ , and all other elements are zero. Then it is easy to check that (ΥTα)T and (ΥTβ )T are (amin, 0)-polarized at
α and at β, respectively. Further, we also have, for all l = 1, 2, . . . , |X1|, (ΥTα)TAα,l + (ΥTβ )TAβ,l = 0 because ω is in the
left null space of A and ωi = 0 for all i 6= α or β. Hence (A,B) is manipulable.
Next notice that both the set of normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vectors and the left null space of A are closed sets.
The former set is also bounded. As a result, if the left null space of A does not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double
polarized vectors, it must also not contain any normalized, (amin, )-double polarized vectors for all small enough positive .
Therefore by choosing s, satisfying (18), small enough, we obtain an A that satisfies (19) and that the left null space of A
contains no (amin, A)-double polarized vectors.
We now turn our attention to the right null space of B. The following result states that normalized vectors in the right null
space of B have similar properties of normalized vectors in the left null space of A as described in Lemma 1:
Lemma 7. The right null space of B consists only of balanced vectors. Suppose that ωT is a non-zero normalized |U |×1
vector in the right null space of B. Let
bmin ,
1
|U |(|Y1|+ 1) .
Then
max
j:ωj>0
ωj ≥ bmin
min
j:ωj<0
ωj ≤ −bmin.
Proof: Let ωT be a vector in the right null space of B. Then
|Y1|∑
i=1
|U |∑
j=1
Bi,jωj = 0.
Swapping the order of the two sums and using the fact that
∑|Y1|
i=1 Bi,j = 1, we get
∑|U |
j=1 ωj = 0. Furthermore suppose
ωT is non-zero and normalized, it must then have at least one positive element and one negative element. Recognizing the
preceding fact, we can employ essentially the same argument in the proof of Lemma 1 to show maxj:ωj>0 ωj ≥ bmin and
minj:ωj<0 ωj ≤ −bmin.
Based on Lemma 7, it is easy to check that the results from Lemma 3 to Corollary 2 all apply to BT with amin replaced
by bmin and a˜n defined in Lemma 5 replaced by b˜n , b2min
(
1 + nbmin
)−1
. That is, the above results are all applicable to
normalized, polarized vectors and matrices in the right null space of B with the corresponding modifications.
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Finally, the next theorem states that non-manipulability of the observation channel (A,B) guarantees the existence of a
counterpart of Corollary 2 for the right null space of B that is to be used in the proof of Theorem 5. To simplify notation
in statement of the lemma, let A denote the set of all |U |2×1 column vectors of the form vec(ΥA), where Υ is a |U |×|U |
matrix whose jth column, for j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |, is balanced and (0, 0)-polarized at j, and ‖Υ‖2 ≤ 2|U |. It is easy to check
that the set A is closed, bounded, and convex. Let A˜ denote the cone hull of A. Then it can be readily checked that A˜ is the
set of vectors of the same form that make up A with the norm bound ‖Υ‖2 ≤ 2|U | removed.
Theorem 4. Suppose that the right null space of B is non-trivial, and the observation channel (A,B) is non-manipulable.
Then there exists a positive κ, which depends only on A and B, satisfying the property that if Ψ is a |U |×|U | matrix whose
columns are vectors in the right null space of B and ‖Ψ‖1 = 1, then there is a normalized vector υ simultaneously giving
υ vec(Ψ) ≥ κ and υωT ≤ 0 for all ωT ∈ A.
Proof: Let n = |U | − rank(B) ≥ 1 be the dimension of the right null space of B. Let Ξ be a |U |×n matrix whose
columns form an orthonormal basis of the right null space of B. By flipping the polarities of the columns of Ξ (i.e., the basis
vectors), we obtain 2n different bases for the right null space of B. Fix a normalized Ψ with columns in the right null space
of B. It is simple to check that 1|U |2 ≤ ‖Ψ‖22 ≤ 1. For each j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |, employing one, say Ξ(j), among the 2n bases
above we can decompose ΨTj as Ψ
T
j =
∑n
i=1
{
ΨTj (Ξ(j)
T
i )
T
}
Ξ(j)Ti with Ψ
T
j (Ξ(j)
T
i )
T ≥ 0 for all i. Let B be the convex hull
of the set of vectors of the form vec(Φ), where Φ is any |U |×|U | matrix such that ΦTj =
∑n
i=1 bi,j Ξ(j)
T
i for j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |
with 1|U |2 ≤
∑n
i=1
∑|U |
j=1 b
2
i,j ≤ 1 and bi,j ≥ 0 for i and j. Obviously vec(Ψ) ∈ B. By geometric reasoning, B is a bounded
set that does not contain the origin.
Since (A,B) is non-manipulable, A˜ must intersect trivially with the set of vectors of the form vec(Φ˜), where Φ˜ is any
|U |×|U | matrix whose columns are vectors in the right null space of B (i.e., the intersection contains only the zero vector).
Hence B and A˜ are disjoint. Below we employ a slightly stronger version of the argument given in [27, pp. 48] to show that
B and A˜ can be strictly separated by a hyperplane that passes through the origin.
Given the above, we conclude that there exist µTa ∈ A˜ and µTb ∈ B that achieve the minimum (positive) Euclidean distance
between A˜ and B. Now let µT1 be an arbitrary vector in A˜. Since A˜ is a convex cone, µTa + t(αµT1 − µTa ) ∈ A˜ for all α > 0
and 0 < t ≤ 1. Hence ‖µa + t(αµ1 − µa)− µb‖22 ≥ ‖µa − µb‖22 for all α > 0 and 0 < t ≤ 1, which (by letting t ↓ 0) implies
(µa − µb)µT1 ≥
1
2α
(‖µa − µb‖22 + ‖µa‖22 − ‖µb‖22) (20)
for all α > 0. Further, letting α→∞ gives
(µa − µb)µT1 ≥ 0. (21)
Similarly, if µT2 be an arbitrary vector in B, then µTb +t(µT2 −µTb ) ∈ B by the convexity of B. Then ‖µb + t(µ2 − µb)− µa‖22 ≥
‖µa − µb‖22 for all 0 < t ≤ 1 gives
(µb − µa)µT2 ≥
1
2
(‖µa − µb‖22 + ‖µb‖22 − ‖µa‖22)
≥ ‖µa − µb‖22 (22)
where the second inequality is due to the fact that ‖µb‖22 − ‖µa‖22 ≥ ‖µa − µb‖22, which can in turn be verified by letting
µT1 = 0 in (20) since 0 ∈ A. Substituting µ1 = ω, µT2 = vec(Ψ), υ = µb−µa‖µb−µa‖1 , and κB =
‖µb−µa‖22
‖µb−µa‖1 in (21) and (22) almost
establishes the lemma. The only technicality left to handle is that κB depends on Ψ. Fortunately, the dependence on Ψ is only
through the basis collection Ξ(1),Ξ(2), . . . ,Ξ(|U |) that produces B. Since there are only finitely many such collections to start
with, the theorem is established by letting the required κ to be the minimum among all the 2n|U | κB’s for the corresponding
basis collections.
B. Bounding attack channel estimation error
Recall that the attack channel matrix ΦN is a |U |×|U | stochastic matrix. We consider below the stochastic matrix ΓN =
BΦNA as defined in (2), as well as estimates Φˆ and Γˆ of ΦN and ΓN , respectively. In particular, we are interested in the
estimators of ΦN in Gµ(Γˆ) defined in Section III-D. For the purpose of proving Theorem 1 in the next section, the following
result, which bounds the estimation error of estimators in Gµ(Γˆ), is important:
Theorem 5. Let Γˆ be an estimate of ΓN based on the observation (yN1 , xN1 ). Let µ > 0 and Φˆ ∈ Gµ(Γˆ) be an estimate of
ΦN . If (A,B) is non-manipulable, then
‖ΦN − Φˆ‖1 ≤ c1µ+ c2 ‖ΓN − Γˆ‖1 + c3 ‖ΦN − I‖1
for some positive constants c1, c2, and c3 that depend only on A and B.
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Proof: Let ΞA and ΞB denote the orthogonal projectors onto the left null space of A and right null space of B, respectively.
We decompose ΦN − Φˆ into three components as below:
ΦN − Φˆ = (ΦN − Φˆ)ΞA︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΘAΨA
+ ΞB(Φ
N − Φˆ)(I − ΞA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
ΛB
+ (I − ΞB)(ΦN − Φˆ)(I − ΞA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Λ
(23)
where the rows of ΨA are normalized, and ΘA is a |U |×|U | diagonal matrices whose strictly positive diagonal elements are
the normalization constants for the rows of ΨA. Note that the rows of ΨA are vectors in the left null space of A. Moreover
the columns of ΛB are vectors in the right null space of B. Also note that we have assumed that ΨA does not contain any
all-zero rows without any loss of generality (see (24) below). Because the rows of ΨA are normalized, we have from (23),
‖ΦN − Φˆ‖1 ≤ ‖ΛB + Λ‖1 +
|U |∑
i=1
ΘAi,i. (24)
Thus it suffices to bound ‖ΛB + Λ‖1 and the diagonal elements of ΘA.
We first bound the diagonal elements of ΘA. To do this, rewrite (23) as
I − Φˆ = I − ΦN + ΘAΨA + ΛB + Λ. (25)
Because Φˆ is a valid stochastic matrix, all diagonal elements of I − Φˆ must be greater than or equal to 0 and all off-diagonal
elements must be less than or equal 0. Thus (25) gives
ΘAi,iΨ
A
i,j
{
≥ −‖I − ΦN‖1 − ‖ΛB + Λ‖1 if j = i
≤ ‖I − ΦN‖1 + ‖ΛB + Λ‖1 if j 6= i.
(26)
Now by Lemma 6, we have s and A respectively satisfy (18) and (19) such that the left null space of A does not contain
any (amin, A)-double polarized vectors. Hence we can choose a positive  < amin so that the conclusion in Corollary 2 is
valid for all n = 2, 3, . . . , |U |. For this , define
S = {i :
∣∣ΨAi is (amin, )-polarized at i}.
Let its cardinality be denoted by n.
We bound ΘAi,i for i /∈ S and i ∈ S separately. First consider any i /∈ S. Lemma 2 states that [ΨAi ]j ≥  for some j 6= i.
Thus we have from (26) that
ΘAi,i ≤
‖I − ΦN‖1 + ‖ΛB + Λ‖1

, (27)
for all i /∈ S.
Next we bound ΘAi,i for i ∈ S. If n = 0, then there is nothing to do. Hence we assume 1 ≤ n ≤ |U | below. Since each
column of ΛB are in the right null space of B, it must be balanced according to Lemma 7. Moreover it is true that each
column of ΦN − Φˆ must also be balanced. As a result, (23) gives ∑|U |i=1 ΘAi,iΨAi,j = −∑|U |i=1 Λi,j for j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |. The
triangle inequality then implies ∣∣∣∣∣∣
|U |∑
i=1
ΘAi,iΨ
A
i,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
|U |∑
i=1
|Λi,j |. (28)
Separating the sum on the left side of (28) into terms with index i in and not in S, we have, for j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,∣∣∣∣∣∑
i∈S
ΘAi,iΨ
A
i,j
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
|U |∑
i=1
|Λi,j |+
∑
i/∈S
ΘAi,i|ΨAi,j |
≤
|U |∑
i=1
|Λi,j |+ |U |

(‖I − ΦN‖1 + ‖ΛB + Λ‖1) (29)
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where the second inequality is obtained by using (27) and the fact that the rows of ΨA are normalized. For 2 ≤ n ≤ |U |,
Corollary 2 suggests that for each i ∈ S,
|U |∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∑
k∈S
ΘAk,kΨ
A
k,j
∣∣∣∣∣ = ΘAi,i
|U |∑
j=1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ΨAi,j +
∑
k∈S,k 6=i
ΘAk,k
ΘAi,i
ΨAk,j
∣∣∣∣∣∣
> ΘAi,is. (30)
Note that the bound in (30) is also trivially valid for the case of n = 1 since s < 1 and the rows of ΨA are normalized.
Substituting (29) into (30), we obtain that for each i ∈ S,
ΘAi,i <
‖Λ‖1
s
+
|U |2
s
(‖I − ΦN‖1 + ‖ΛB + Λ‖1) (31)
Because s ≤ 1, the upper bound on ΘAi,i for i ∈ S is greater than the upper bound on ΘAi,i for i /∈ S. Thus we can employ
(31) as an upper bound for all ΘAi,i’s. Note that the choices of A, s, and  depend only A.
Next we proceed to bound ‖ΛB‖1. Similar to before, write ΛBA = θBΨB , where ‖ΨB‖1 = 1 and θB is the non-negative
scaling factor. If the right null space of B is trivial, ΛB = 0 and hence θB = 0. Otherwise, θB > 0. Without loss of generality,
suppose the latter is true below. Because the linear mapping (·)A with domain restricted to the orthogonal complement of the
left null space of A is invertible, we have
‖ΛB‖1 ≤ cA‖ΛBA‖1 = cAθB (32)
for some constant cA that depends only on A. Thus bounding θB is sufficient. To that end, right multiply both sides of (25)
by A to obtain
(I − Φˆ)A︸ ︷︷ ︸
∆
= θBΨB + (I − ΦN )A+ ΛA. (33)
Since Φˆ is stochastic, vec(∆) ∈ A, where A is the set of |U |2×1 column vectors defined just right before Theorem 4 in
Section VI-A. As (A,B) is non-manipulable and the left-null space of B is non-trivial, Theorem 4 guarantees the existence
of a positive constant κ and a normalized vector ν giving ν vec(∆) ≤ 0 and ν vec(ΨB) ≥ κ. Note that κ depends only on A
and B. Hence left-multiplying both sides of the vectorized version of (33) by ν yields
θB ≤
∣∣ν {vec((I − ΦN )A) + vec(ΛA)}∣∣
κ
≤ ‖(I − Φ
N )A‖1 + ‖ΛA‖1
κ
≤
√|U ||X1|2
κ
(‖I − ΦN‖1 + ‖Λ‖1) .
Applying this bound on θB back to (32), we obtain
‖ΛB‖1 ≤ cA
√|U ||X1|2
κ
(‖I − ΦN‖1 + ‖Λ‖1) . (34)
To complete the proof, we need to bound ‖Λ‖1. Note that there exists Γ˜ such that BΦˆA = ΠBΓ˜ΠA and ‖ΠB(Γ˜− Γˆ)ΠA‖1 ≤
µ since Φˆ ∈ Gµ(Γˆ). Then
BΛA = B(ΦN − Φˆ)A = ΓN −ΠBΓ˜ΠA
= ΠB(Γ
N − Γˆ)ΠA + ΠB(Γˆ− Γ˜)ΠA (35)
where the last equality is due to the fact that ΓN = ΠBΓNΠA. Note that the linear mapping B(·)A with domain restricted
simultaneously to the orthogonal complements of the right null space of B and left null space of A is invertible. Combining
this fact and (35), there exists a positive constant cAB , which depends only on A and B, such that
‖Λ‖1 ≤ cAB
(√
|X1||Y1| · ‖ΓN − Γˆ‖1 + µ
)
. (36)
Finally, substituting (36), (34), and (31) back into (24), we obtain the desired bound on ‖ΦN − Φˆ‖1 given in the statement
of the theorem with
c1 =
cAB |U |
s
+ cAB
(
1 +
|U |3
s
)(
1 +
cA
√|U ||X1|2
κ
)
c2 =
√
|X1||Y1| · c1
c3 =
|U |3
s
+
cA
√|U ||X1|2
κ
(
1 +
|U |3
s
)
.
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C. Proof of Theorem 1 and Corollary 1
1) Detectability: We prove the detectability portion of the theorem by showing that the sequence of decision statistics
{DN = ‖ΦˆN − I‖1}, where ΦˆN is the estimator for the stochastic matrix ΦN defined in (4), satisfies the two desired
properties if the observation channel (A,B) is non-manipulable.
To that end, first note that ΦˆN is obtained from the conditional histogram estimator ΓˆN of the stochastic matrix ΓN defined
in (3). We need the following convergence property of the sequence {ΓˆN}:
Lemma 8. ‖ΓN − ΓˆN‖1 → 0 in probability as N approaches infinity.
Proof: First, define the |U |×|X1| stochastic matrix ΩN by its (i, j)th element as
ΩNi,j ,
piN (vi, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
. (37)
For any µ > 0, it is clear that
Pr
(
‖ΓN − ΓˆN‖1 > µ
)
≤Pr
(
‖BΩN − ΓˆN‖1 > µ
2
)
+ Pr
(
‖BΩN − ΓN‖1 > µ
2
)
≤Pr
(
‖BΩN − ΓˆN‖1 > µ
2
)
+ Pr
(
‖ΩN − ΦNA‖1 > µ
2
√|X1||Y1| · ‖B‖2
)
. (38)
Thus the lemma is proved if we can show that the two probabilities on the right hand side of (38) converge to 0 as N
approaches infinity.
To that end, notice first that
‖BΩN − ΓˆN‖1
=
|Y1|∑
i=1
|X1|∑
j=1
|[BΩN ]i,j − ΓˆNi,j |
≤
|Y1|∑
i=1
|X1|∑
j=1
|U |∑
k=1
∣∣∣ p(y1,i|vk)piN (vk, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
− pi
N (y1,i, vk, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Hi,j,k
∣∣∣
where the inequality above is due to the fact that piN (y1,i, x1,j) =
∑
k pi
N (y1,i, vk, x1,j). This implies that
Pr
(
‖BΩN − ΓˆN‖1 > µ
2
)
≤
|Y1|∑
i=1
|X1|∑
j=1
|U |∑
k=1
Pr
(
|Hi,j,k| > µ
2|U ||X1||Y1|
)
. (39)
But for any i, j, and k,
Pr
(
|Hi,j,k| > µ
2|U ||X1||Y1|
)
≤ 4|U |
2|X1|2|Y1|2
µ2
E
[
H2i,j,k
]
≤ 4|U |
2|X1|2|Y1|2
µ2
{
Pr(xN1 /∈ TN[X1],δ) + E[X1],δ[H2i,j,k]
}
,
(40)
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where E[X1],δ[·] denotes that conditional expectation E[·|xN1 ∈ TN[X1],δ]. Further, for any small enough positive δ,
E[X1],δ[H
2
i,j,k]
≤ E[X1],δ
[
(p(y1,i|vk)piN (vk, x1,j)− piN (y1,i, vk, x1,j))2
]
N2(p(x1,j)− δ)2
=
∑N
n=1E[X1],δ
[
E
[
(p(y1,i|vk)− 1n(y1,i))2|vN , xN1
]
· 1n(vk, x1,j)
]
N2(p(x1,j)− δ)2
≤ p(y1,i|vk)
N(p(x1,j)− δ)2 (41)
where the equality on the third line above results from the fact that p(yN1 |vN , xN1 ) = p(yN1 |vN ) and the elements of yN1
are conditionally independent given vN . Combining (41) and the well known fact, for example see [26, Theorem 6.2], that
Pr(xN1 /∈ TN[X1],δ)→ 0 as N →∞, we get from (40) that Pr
(
|Hi,j,k| > µ2|U ||X1||Y1|
)
→ 0 as N →∞. Using (39), we further
get Pr
(
‖BΩN − ΓˆN‖1 > µ2
)
→ 0 as N →∞.
Next, note that we can rewrite (37) as
ΩNi,j =
piN (ui, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
−
∑
k 6=i
piN (vk, ui, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
+
∑
k 6=i
piN (vi, uk, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
.
Similarly, we have [
ΦNA
]
i,j
= p(ui|x1,j)−
∑
k 6=i
piN (vk, ui)
piN (ui)
p(ui|x1,j)
+
∑
k 6=i
piN (vi, uk)
piN (uk)
p(uk|xj).
Let
H1i,j =
piN (ui, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
− p(ui|x1,j)
H2i,j =
∑
k 6=i
piN (vk, ui, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
− pi
N (vk, ui)
piN (ui)
p(ui|x1,j)
H3i,j =
∑
k 6=i
piN (vi, uk, x1,j)
piN (x1,j)
− pi
N (vi, uk)
piN (uk)
p(uk|x1,j).
Then we have, for each i and j,
Pr
(∣∣ΩNi,j − [ΦNA]i,j∣∣ > µ
2|U ||X1|
√|X1||Y1| · ‖B‖2
)
≤
3∑
l=1
Pr
(
|H li,j | >
µ
6|U ||X1|
√|X1||Y1| · ‖B‖2
)
. (42)
By employing the fact that p(xN1 |uN , vN ) = p(xN1 |uN ) and the conditional independence of the elements of uN given xN1 ,
each of the three probabilities on the right hand side of (42) can be shown to converge to 0 as N approaches infinity by using
typicality arguments similar to the one that shows Pr
(
|Hi,j,k| > µ2|U ||X1||Y1|
)
→ 0 above. Thus, the probability on the left
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hand side of (42) also converges to 0 as N approaches infinity. Finally,
Pr
(
‖ΩN − ΦNA‖1 > µ
2
√|X1||Y1| · ‖B‖2
)
≤
|U |∑
i=1
|X1|∑
j=1
Pr
(∣∣ΩNi,j − [ΦNA]i,j∣∣
>
µ
2|U ||X1|
√|X1||Y1| · ‖B‖2
)
→ 0
as N →∞.
Now we proceed to show detectability in Theorem 1. For any fixed µ > 0, choose ΦˆN according to (4). It is clear from
the definition of Gµ(ΓˆN ) in Section III-D that ΦN ∈ Gµ(ΓˆN ) whenever ‖ΓN − ΓˆN‖1 ≤ µ√|X1||Y1| . Thus Lemma 8 implies
that Pr(ΦN ∈ Gµ(ΓˆN ))→ 1 as N →∞, and hence the probability that Gµ(ΓˆN ) is non-empty approaches 1. We employ this
property below to show that the sequence of decision statistics {‖ΦˆN − I‖1} satisfies both Properties 1 and 2 stated in the
theorem.
To show Property 1 of Theorem 1, first note that
Pr
(
‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ
⋂
‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ
)
≥ Pr
(
ΦN ∈ Gµ(ΓˆN )
⋂
‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ⋂
‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ
)
= Pr
(
ΦN ∈ Gµ(ΓˆN )
⋂
‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ
)
≥ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ)− Pr(ΦN /∈ Gµ(ΓˆN )) (43)
where the equality on the third line is due to the definition of ΦˆN in (4). Hence, if lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) > 0,
(43) implies
lim sup
N→∞
Pr(‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ | ‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 1.
To show Property 2 of Theorem 1, consider the constants c1, c2, and c3 given in Theorem 5. Let c = 2 + c3. By choosing
0 < µ ≤ δ2c1 and making use of Theorem 5, it is easy to check that
Pr
(
‖ΓN − ΓˆN‖1 ≤ µ√|X1||Y1|
⋂
‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ
)
≤ Pr
(
‖ΦˆN − I‖1 ≤ cδ
⋂
‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ
)
which in turn implies
Pr
(
‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > cδ
⋂
‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ
)
≤ Pr
(
‖ΓN − ΓˆN‖1 > µ√|X1||Y1|
)
. (44)
Hence by Lemma 8, if lim infN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ) > 0, (44) gives
lim
N→∞
Pr(‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > cδ | ‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ) = 0.
2) Corollary 1: Now we can use the results above to prove Corollary 1 by showing the sequence of decision statistics
{‖ΦˆN − I‖1} satisfies the four stated properties under the corresponding special cases:
a) ‖ΦN − I‖1 → 0 in probability: Since
Pr(‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ)
≤ Pr
(
‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ
∣∣∣ ‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ
c
)
· Pr
(
‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ
c
)
+ Pr
(
‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ
c
)
for any δ > 0, Property 2 of Theorem 1 implies limN→∞ Pr(‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ) = 0.
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b) ‖ΦN − I‖1 9 0 in probability: If lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 0, then there is nothing to show. Otherwise,
Lemma 8 and (43) give lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦˆN − I‖1 > δ) ≥ lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ).
c) ‖ΦNM − Φ‖1 → 0 in probability and Φ 6= I: Note that there exists δ > 0 such that lim supN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 >
δ) = 1 in this case. For any such δ, Property 2 just above implies the required result.
d) ‖ΦN − Φ‖1 → 0 in probability and Φ 6= I: In this case, there exists δ > 0 such that limN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ) = 1.
Using Lemma 8 and (43) gives the desired result for any such δ.
3) Converse: Recall that xN1 and y
N
1 are the sequences of symbols transmitted and received by node 1 at time instants
1, 2, . . . , N and N + 1, N + 2, . . . , 2N , respectively. Let DN = DN (xN1 , y
N
1 ) be the N th decision statistic in the sequence,
assumed to exist in the statement of Theorem 1, that satisfies Properties 1 and 2. Suppose that there exists a stochastic Φ′ 6= I
such that BΦ′A = BA , Γ.
For the identity relay manipulation map, i.e., φN (uN ) = uN , it is easy to check that p(vn|un) = ∏Nn=1 Iχn(vN ),χn(uN ),
ΦN = I , and p(yN |xN ) = ∏Nn=1 Γχn(yN1 ),χn(xN1 ). Since ΦN = I for all N , we have for every δ > 0,∑
(xN1 ,y
N
1 ):D
N (xN1 ,y
N
1 )>δ
[
N∏
i=n
Γχn(yN1 ),χn(xN1 ) · p(x1,χn(xN1 ))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
q(yN1 ,x
N
1 )
= Pr(DN > δ)
= Pr
(
DN > δ
∣∣∣ ‖ΦN − I‖1 ≤ δ
c
)
→ 0 (45)
where the convergence on the last line is due to the assumption that Property 2 of Theorem 1 holds, and c is the constant
described in the property.
Consider now the random relay manipulation map that results in p(vn|un) = ∏Nn=1 Φ′χn(vN ),χn(uN ). For this random
manipulation map, it is again easy to check that p(yN |xN ) = ∏Nn=1 Γχn(yN1 ),χn(xN1 ), which is a consequence of the assumption
that BΦ′A = Γ, and ‖ΦN − Φ′‖1 → 0 in probability. Since Φ′ 6= I , there exists a δ > 0 such that limN→∞ Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 >
δ) = 1. For this δ,
lim sup
N→∞
∑
(xN1 ,y
N
1 ):D
N (xN1 ,y
N
1 )>δ
q(yN1 , x
N
1 )
= lim sup
N→∞
Pr(DN > δ)
≥ lim sup
N→∞
Pr
(
DN > δ
∣∣∣ ‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ)
· lim
N→∞
Pr(‖ΦN − I‖1 > δ)
= 1 (46)
where the equality on the last line is due to the assumption that Property 1 of Theorem 1 holds. The conclusions in (45) and
(46) are clearly in conflict and can not be simultaneously true. Therefore there can not exist a stochastic Φ′ 6= I such that
BΦ′A = BA and Properties 1 and 2 hold.
To complete the proof of the converse, we need to show the existence of a stochastic Φ′ 6= I with the property that
BΦ′A = BA when the observation channel (A,B) is manipulable. To that end, first note that the manipulability of (A,B)
implies the existence of a non-zero Υ with the property that all columns of ΥA are in the right null space of B. In addition,
(ΥTj )
T is balanced and (0, 0)-polarized at j, for each j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |. Let Υ˜ = Υmaxj Υj,j and Φ′ = I − Υ˜. It then easy to
check that this Φ′ is a valid stochastic matrix, Φ′ 6= 1, and BΦ′A = BA.
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D. Justification for Algorithms 1 and 2
Algorithm 1: Let Υ be a |U |×|U | matrix-valued variable and s be a |U |×1 vector-valued variable. Consider the following
convex optimization problem:
min
s,Υ
min{−s1,−s2, . . . ,−s|U |}
subject to
BΥA = 0
|U |∑
k=1
Υk,l = 0 l = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
sk −Υk,k ≤ 0 k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
Υk,k − 1 ≤ 0 k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
Υk,l ≤ 0 k 6= l = 1, 2, . . . , |U |. (47)
It is clear that the optimal value of (47) is attained and lies inside the interval [−1, 0]. This further implies that (A,B) is
non-manipulable if and only if the optimal value of (47) is 0.
Now, let Ω and ν be the |X1|×|Y1| matrix-valued and |U |×1 vector-valued Lagrange multipliers for the equality constraints
shown in the third and fourth lines of (47). Further, let Λ be the |U |×|U | matrix-valued Lagrange multiplier matrix. The
diagonal elements of Λ correspond to the inequality constraints shown in the fifth line of (47), while the off-diagonal elements
correspond to the inequality constraints shown in the last line of (47). At last, let ν be the |U |×1 vector-valued Lagrange
multiplier for the inequality constraints shown in second line of (47). Following the development in [27, Ch. 5], we obtain the
Lagrange dual function of (47) as below:
g(γ,Λ, ν,Ω)
=

−∑|U |k=1 γk if
Λk,k ≥ 1 k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
γk + νk + [AΩB]k,k = Λk,k k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
νk + [AΩB]k,l = −Λk,l k 6= l = 1, 2, . . . , |U |
−∞ otherwise.
Consider the Lagrange dual problem of (47):
max
γ,Λ,ν,Ω
g(γ,Λ, ν,Ω)
subject to
γk ≥ 0 k = 1, 2, . . . , |U |,
Λk,l ≥ 0 k, l = 1, 2, . . . , |U |. (48)
Since the primal problem (47) satisfies the Slater’s condition [27, Ch. 5], the optimal duality gap between the primal and dual
problems is zero. That is, the optimal value of (48) is the same as the optimal value of (47). Hence (A,B) is non-manipulable
if and only if the optimal value of (48) is 0. Finally, it is easy to verify that the negation of the optimal value of the linear
program in Step 2 of Algorithm 1 is the optimal value of (48) and vice versa. As a result, Algorithm 1 determines whether
(A,B) is manipulable.
Proof of Theorem 2: In the proof of Lemma 6, we have shown that the condition of (A,B) being non-manipulable implies
that no normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector can be in the left null space of A. It remains to show the reverse
implication here.
Given that the left null space of A does not contain any (amin, 0)-double polarized vector, we need to show that (A,B) is
non-manipulable when the right null space of B is trivial. To that end, let us suppose on the contrary that (A,B) is manipulable.
Since the right null space of B is trivial, there exists a |U |×|U | non-zero matrix Υ in the left null space of A, with its jth
column, (ΥTj )
T , for each j = 1, 2, . . . , |U |, is balanced and (0, 0)-polarized at j. Let m be the number of non-zero columns
of Υ. By proper permutation of rows and columns of Υ if necessary, we can assume with no loss of generality that the first
m columns are non-zero while the remaining |U | −m columns are zero.
First, we claim that m ≥ 2. Indeed, suppose that m = 1 and only the first column (ΥT1 )T is non-zero. Then we have
Υ1,1 > 0 and Υ1,1A1 = 0. Since it is our assumption that A contains no zero rows, we must have Υ1,1 = 0, which creates a
contradiction.
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Next, let
Υ˜1 =
Υ1
‖Υ1‖1
Υ˜2 =
Υ2
‖Υ2‖1
...
Υ˜m =
∑|U |
i=m Υi
‖∑|U |i=m Υi‖1 .
Put these m row vectors together to form the m×|U | matrix Υ˜. Using the fact that (ΥTj )T is balanced and (0, 0)-polarized at
j for j = 1, 2, . . . ,m together with Lemma 1, it is easy to check that Υ˜ is a normalized, (amin, 0)-polarized matrix in the left
null space of A. Moreover, it is also true that
m−1∑
i=1
‖Υi‖1 Υ˜i +
∥∥∥∥ |U |∑
i=m
Υi
∥∥∥∥
1
Υ˜m = 0. (49)
Now, as argued in the proof of Lemma 6, there must exist s and A, which respectively satisfy (18) and (19), such that the
left null space of A contains no (amin, A)-double polarized vector. Hence we can apply Corollary 2 to Υ˜ to deduce that no
row of it can be s-dependent upon the other rows. However, this conclusion contradicts (49). Therefore (A,B) must not be
manipulable.
Algorithm 2: We use Lemma 1 to show that the Algorithm 2 can be used to check for double polarized vectors in the
left null space of A. To that end, recall that n = |U | − rank(A) is the dimension of the left null space of A. If n = 0, the
left null space of A is trivial and hence it can not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized vector. For n > 0, let
Υ = (I Υ˜) be the row-reduced echelon basis matrix as stated in Step 2) of the algorithm. When n = |U | − 1, Υ˜i is a scalar,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n. By Lemma 1, Υ˜i must be negative and the normalized version of Υi must be a (amin, 0)-double polarized
vector in the left null space of A.
Now assume 1 ≤ n ≤ |U | − 2 and consider the stated steps. First note that any (amin, 0)-double polarized vector in the left
null space of A can only be a linear combination of at most two rows of Υ. If in Step 3c) there is a Υ˜i that contains all but one
zero element, Lemma 1 again forces the non-zero element be negative and the normalized version of Υi be a (amin, 0)-double
polarized vector in the left null space of A. Otherwise no (normalized) rows of Υ can be (amin, 0)-double polarized. Hence
it remains to check whether any pair of rows of Υ can be linearly combined to form a double polarized vector. Without loss
of generality, suppose that the normalized version of c1Υ1 + c2Υ2 is (amin, 0)-double polarized for some non-zero constants
c1 and c2. Then it is easy to see that c1 and c2 must be of opposite signs and Υ˜1 = − c2c1 Υ˜2. Hence if no pairs of rows of Υ˜
satisfy the condition checked in Step 3d), the left null space of A can not contain any normalized, (amin, 0)-double polarized
vector.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that it is possible to detect whether an amplify-and-forward relay is maliciously manipulating the symbols that it
forwards to the other nodes by just monitoring the relayed symbols. In particular, we established a non-manipulable condition
on the channel that serves as a necessary and sufficient requirement guaranteeing the existence of a sequence of decision
statistics that can be used to distinguish a malicious relay from a non-malicious one.
An important conclusion of the result is that maliciousness detectability in the context of Theorem 1 is solely determined
by the source distributions and the conditional pmfs of the underlying MAC and BC in the channel model, regardless of how
the relay may manipulate the symbols. Thus similar to capacity, maliciousness detectability is in fact a channel characteristic.
The development of maliciousness detectability in this paper did not take any restrictions on the rate and coding structure
of information transfer between the sources into account. A joint formulation of maliciousness detectability and information
transfer is currently under investigation.
Another interesting application of the result is that the necessity of non-manipulability can be employed to show that
maliciousness detectability is impossible for non amplify-and-forward relays in many channel scenarios. For instance, if Romeo
in the motivating example considered in Section II forwards his received symbol modulo-2 instead, we arrive at the physical-
layer network coding (PNC) model considered in [28]. The necessity condition of Theorem 1 can be employed to verify the
impossibility of maliciousness detectability with the PNC operation represented by the matrix B. For this relaying operation,
additional signaling may be needed to allow for maliciousness detection.
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